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INDEPENDENT CRIME LABORATORIES:  
THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATIONAL AND COGNITIVE BIAS 
 
Paul C. Giannelli* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
One of the most controversial recommendations in the National Academy 
of Sciences’ report on forensic science, Strengthening Forensic Science in the 
United States: A Path Forward (NAS Report),1 concerns the removal of crime 
laboratories from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies.2 
According to the NAS Report:  
 
The best science is conducted in a scientific setting as opposed to a 
law enforcement setting. Because forensic scientists often are driven 
in their work by a need to answer a particular question related to the 
issues of a particular case, they sometimes face pressure to sacrifice 
appropriate methodology for the sake of expediency.3 
 
For decades, scholars have commented on the “inbred bias of crime 
laboratories affiliated with law enforcement agencies”4—as have courts,5 
                                                 
*  © 2010 Paul C. Giannelli, Albert J. Weatherhead III & Richard W. 
Weatherhead Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University; University of 
Virginia, J.D., 1970, LL.M., 1975; George Washington University, M.S. Forensic 
Science, 1973. 
1  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009) 
[hereinafter NAS REPORT]. The report’s recommendation for an independent federal 
entity, the National Institute of Forensic Science, is also controversial. Id. at 19–20 
(Recommendation 1). 
2  Id. at 24 (Recommendation 4). The report also states: “Scientific and medical 
assessment conducted in forensic investigations should be independent of law 
enforcement efforts either to prosecute criminal suspects or even to determine whether 
a criminal act has indeed been committed. Administratively, this means that forensic 
scientists should function independently of law enforcement administrators.” Id. at 23. 
3  Id. at 23–24. 
4  James E. Starrs, The Seamy Side of Forensic Science: The Mephitic Stain of 
Fred Salem Zain, 17 SCI. SLEUTHING REV. 1, 8 (1993); see also Paul C. Giannelli, The 
Abuse of Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: The Need for Independent Crime 
Laboratories, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 439, 441 (1997) (“Too many experts in the 
criminal justice system manifest a police-prosecution bias, a willingness to shade or 
distort opinions to support the state’s case.”); Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: 
The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 160 (1991) (“Another [problem] 
is the failure of forensic scientists to shield themselves from possible bias.”); Andre A. 
Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 6 (1993) (stating crime labs “may be so imbued with a 
pro-police bias that they are willing to circumvent true scientific investigation methods 
for the sake of ‘making their point.’”); James E. Starrs, The Ethical Obligations of the 
Forensic Scientist in the Criminal Justice System, 54 J. ASS’N OFFICIAL ANALYTICAL 
CHEMISTS 906, 910 (1971) (noting that lab personnel “inevitably become part of the 
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legislators,6 prosecutors,7 investigators,8 and reporters.9 The NAS Report is not 
the first to acknowledge the problem of bias. The National Academy of 
Sciences’ 1996 DNA Report observed that “[l]aboratory procedures should be 
designed with safeguards to detect bias and to identify cases of true 
ambiguity.”10 Similarly, the ABA Standards on DNA Evidence contain a 
provision on bias.11 
The problem of bias in crime laboratories is not unique to the United 
States. According to a British court:  
 
Forensic scientists may become partisan. The very fact that the police 
seek their assistance may create a relationship between the police and 
the forensic scientists. And the adversarial character of the 
proceedings tends to promote this process. Forensic scientists 
employed by the government may come to see their function as 
helping the police.12  
                                                                                                                      
effort to bring an offender to justice. And as a result, their impartiality is replaced by a 
viewpoint colored brightly with prosecutorial bias.”); Symposium on Science and the 
Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642 (1983) (statement of Professor Joseph 
L. Peterson) (noting the factors that “raise a legitimate issue regarding the objectivity 
of laboratory personnel”). 
5  See R v. Ward, [1993] 96 Crim. App. 1, 68 (U.K.) (“Forensic scientists may 
become partisan.”). 
6  See Rodney Ellis, Editorial, Want Tough on Crime? Start by Fixing HPD Lab., 
HOUS. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2004 (“When crime labs are operating within a police 
department, examiner bias can undermine the integrity of scientific results.”). Ellis was 
a Texas state senator at the time he wrote the editorial. See id. 
7  See Scott Bales, Turning the Microscope Back on Forensic Scientists, 26 LITIG. 
51, 55 (2000) (“But whether nefarious or innocent, too close a connection between 
scientists and the law enforcement officers with whom they work creates a real danger 
of biased testimony.”). As an assistant U.S. attorney, Justice Bales served on the team 
that produced the 1997 I.G. Report on the FBI lab. See infra text accompanying notes 
38–39. He is now a justice on the Arizona Supreme Court. 
8  See M.A. Thomson, Bias and Quality Control in Forensic Science: A Cause 
for Concern, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 504, 509–10 (1974) (“Is the witness who has his job 
and salary controlled by the State completely free from pressure, conscious or 
unconscious, to be entirely impartial?”). Captain Thomson was an Air Force 
investigator at the time he wrote this article. See id. at 504 n.1. 
9  See Steve Mills et al., When Labs Falter, Defendants Pay: Bias Toward 
Prosecution Cited in Illinois Cases, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 20, 2004, at 1; Ruth Teichroeb, 
Crime Labs Too Beholden to Prosecutors, Critics Say, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
July 23, 2004, at A13. 
10  NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA 
EVIDENCE 85 (1996). The report adds: “Bias in forensic science usually leads to sins of 
omission rather than commission. Possibly exculpating evidence might be ignored or 
rejected.” Id. at 84–85. 
11  AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  
DNA EVIDENCE 67 (3d ed. 2007) [hereinafter ABA DNA STANDARDS] (“Cognitive 
bias (e.g., observer effects) occurs because people tend to see what they expect to see, 
and this typically affects their decision in cases of ambiguity.”), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/dnaevidence.pdf. 
12  R v. Ward, [1993] 96 Crim. App. 1, 68 (U.K.). 
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One commentator concluded that the miscarriages of justice in Britain 
constituted “unequivocal evidence that the pro-prosecution orientation of 
government scientists . . .  had not adequately been countered in England.”13  
Some commentators have proposed independent laboratories as the 
remedy for this problem,14 and in 2002, the Illinois Governor’s Commission on 
Capital Punishment proposed the establishment of an independent state crime 
laboratory.15 The Commission majority believed that “the overall quality of 
forensic services would be improved if the laboratory personnel were truly 
independent.”16 In contrast, the Department of Justice17 and the National 
District Attorneys Association oppose the NAS recommendation of 
independent laboratories.18 
This Essay examines the issue of independent crime laboratories. Part I 
documents the problems that triggered the NAS Report’s recommendation, 
while Part II explores the counterarguments. Part III examines the NAS 
                                                 
13  Ian Freckelton, Science and the Legal Culture, 2 EXPERT EVID. 107, 112 
(1993); see also David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the 
Commonwealth, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 123, 171 (1996) (“Many reformers in the United 
Kingdom believe that a large percentage of the problems that have arisen in the 
forensic science context are attributable to the fact that English forensic science is 
almost solely the province of the state.”); Paul Roberts, Forensic Science Evidence 
After Runciman, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 780, 784 (commenting that “forensic scientists 
who run with the hounds cannot be expected to give a savaged fox the kiss of life”) 
(citing Russell Stockdale, Running with the Hounds, NEW L.J. 772 (June 7, 1991)). 
14  See BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION, 
AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 257 (2000) (stating 
laboratories should “function as an independent third force within the criminal justice 
system”); Giannelli, supra note 4, at 457–62 (arguing for labs associated with a 
medical examiner system); see also Ellis, supra note 6 (stating “crime labs should 
operate as a separate and independent third party force in the criminal justice system”). 
15  REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 52 
(2002), available at http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/ 
chapter_03.pdf [hereinafter CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM.] (“An independent state 
forensic laboratory should be created, operated by civilian personnel, with its own 
budget, separate from any police agency or supervision.”). The proposal was never 
adopted. 
16  Id.  
17  Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 13 (2009) (statement of Kenneth E. Melson, Acting Dir., 
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives) (“DOJ also questions whether 
full independence of laboratories from law enforcement is advisable or feasible. . . . To 
be separated completely from interaction with investigative partners would likely cause 
missteps in decision-making that could result in either loss and/or destruction of 
evidence, or important analyses left undone.”). 
18  National District Attorneys Association, NDAA Comments Provided to the 
Consortium of Forensic Sciences Regarding the National Academy of Sciences Report 
[hereinafter NDAA Statement] (“NDAA does not believe, as some have suggested, 
that all forensic labs must be ‘independent,’ that is, housed outside of a law 
enforcement or prosecution agency.”). 
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proposal as well as an alternative approach. Part IV sets forth additional 
measures that should protect forensic analyses from improper influence. 
 
I.  THE PROBLEM 
 
A.  Organizational Structure 
 
Crime laboratories are “the oldest and strongest link between science and 
technology and criminal justice.”19 In the United States, crime laboratories 
developed in the 1920s as an adjunct of police departments.20 A survey of 
approximately three hundred crime laboratories revealed that “[s]eventy-nine 
percent of all laboratories responding . . . are located within law enforcement/ 
public safety agencies”21 and “[f]ifty-seven percent . . . would only examine 
evidence submitted by law enforcement officials.”22 Thus, it is not surprising 
that police norms would influence the laboratory culture. As one scholar 
observed: “[T]he police agency controls the formal and informal system of 
rewards and sanctions for the laboratory examiners.”23 
 
B.  Types of Bias 
 
Commentators have identified both motivational and cognitive bias as a 
concern in the forensic setting.24 These classifications are not mutually 
exclusive, and cognitive bias comes in several forms.25 
                                                 
19  PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967). 
20  See RICHARD SAFERSTEIN, CRIMINALISTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO FORENSIC 
SCIENCE 6 (5th ed. 1995) (“The oldest forensic laboratory in the United States is that of 
the Los Angeles Police Department, created in 1923 by August Vollmer, a police chief 
from Berkeley, California.”); John I. Thornton, Criminalistics—Past, Present and 
Future, 11 LEX ET SCIENTIA 1, 23 (1975) (“In 1923, Vollmer served as Chief of Police 
of the City of Los Angeles for a period of one year. During that time, a crime 
laboratory was established at his direction.”); see also Bales, supra note 7, at 55 (“The 
tie between crime labs and law enforcement agencies is not inevitable. In part, it is a 
product of history: rudimentary crime labs were first established near the turn of the 
century by law enforcement agencies when officials began to recognize the possible 
application of science to criminal investigations. Since that time, the relationship 
between labs and law enforcement has flourished because of practical benefits—for 
example, streamlining tasks such as close and timely communication, the transfer of 
evidence, and record-keeping.”). 
21  Joseph L. Peterson et al., The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the Nations’ 
Criminalistic Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 11 (1985). 
22  Id. at 13. 
23  Symposium on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 642 
(1983) (statement of Professor Joseph L. Peterson). 
24  MIKE REDMAYNE, EXPERT EVIDENCE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 14 (2001) (“The 
psychological literature distinguishes motivational and cognitive bias.”). 
25  The leading article on the subject is D. Michael Risinger et al., The 
Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science: Hidden 
Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–21 (2002) (describing 
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1.  Motivational Bias 
 
Motivational bias “is close to the popular notion of bias (the referee is 
biased because he wants one side to win).”26 Several notorious examples seem 
to fit within this category. For example, Fred Zain, who became infamous 
because of his misconduct at the West Virginia state crime laboratory, 
routinely reported results that favored the prosecution.27 An investigation by 
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors/Laboratory Accreditation 
Board (ASCLD/LAB), found that, “when in doubt, Zain’s findings would 
always inculpate the suspect.”28 His replacement as director of serology 
described Zain as “very pro-prosecution.”29 Zain was such a treasured witness 
that, even after he left the state to accept a position in a San Antonio crime 
laboratory, West Virginia prosecutors sent evidence to him for retesting.30 The 
prosecutors relied on Zain because the remaining West Virginia serologists 
were incapable, in their view, of reaching the “right” results.31 
While working at the Oklahoma City Crime Laboratory for nearly twenty 
years, Joyce Gilchrist repeatedly overstated test results, withheld evidence, and 
provided critical evidence for the prosecution.32 The Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit criticized Gilchrist for “provid[ing] the jury with evidence 
                                                                                                                      
several types of cognitive bias, including observer effects, anchoring effects, role 
effects, conformity effects, and experimenter effects). 
26  REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 14. 
27  Zain falsified test results in as many as 134 cases from 1979 to 1989. See In re 
Investigation of the W.Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 S.E.2d 501, 
510–11 (W.Va. 1993). In reviewing a judicial report on Zain’s decade of misconduct, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court spoke of “shocking and . . . egregious violations” 
and the “corruption of our legal system.” Id. at 508.  The judicial inquiry concluded 
that “as a matter of law, any testimonial or documentary evidence offered by Zain at 
any time in any criminal prosecution should be deemed invalid, unreliable, and 
inadmissible.” Id. at 520; see generally Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and 
Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 172–74 
(2007) (discussing Zain’s conduct). 
28  In re Investigation of W.Va., 438 S.E.2d at 512 n.9. 
29  Id. at 514 n.23. 
30  His work in Texas also proved troublesome: “In the case of Gilbert Alejandro, 
the expert, Fred Zain claimed a DNA match when in fact Zain had never conducted 
any testing beyond initial inconclusive testing, and final DNA testing conducted after 
the trial excluded Alejandro.” Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 55, 84 n.109 (2008). 
31  According to Zain’s replacement, “several prosecutors expressed 
dissatisfaction with the reports they were receiving from serology and specifically 
requested that the evidence be analyzed by Zain.” In re Investigation of W. Va., 438 
S.E.2d at 513 n.16 (referring to deposition of T.S. Smith). “[Serologist] Myers also 
testified that after he had been unable to find blood on a murder suspect’s jacket, it was 
sent to Texas, where Zain found a bloodstain which tested consistent with the blood of 
the victim.” Id. at 512. “[Serologist] Bowles also testified that at least twice after Zain 
left the lab, evidence on which Bowles had been unable to obtain genetic markers was 
subsequently sent to Texas for testing by Zain, who again was able to identify genetic 
markers.” Id. 
32  See Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001). 
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implicating [a defendant] in the sexual assault of the victim which she knew 
was rendered false and misleading by evidence withheld from the defense.”33 
As one author commented: “If [Gilchrist] were simply incompetent, her 
mistakes would have been all over the map. Instead, her mistakes benefited the 
prosecution.”34 
 
2.  Cognitive Bias: Role Effects 
 
If the motivation is subconscious, the bias can be classified as a type of 
cognitive bias called “role effect” bias.35 In short, people’s perception of their 
role can influence their decisions, especially in cases of ambiguity. “Given 
what is known about reference group phenomena, the need that people have for 
social support of attitudes and conduct, and the process of socialization in 
occupational settings, it strains credulity to believe that these experts do not 
identify with prosecutors.”36 According to a former laboratory director, “Many 
forensic scientists at the state police labs . . . saw their role as members of the 
state’s attorney’s team. ‘They thought they were prosecution witnesses[.]’ . . . 
‘They didn’t understand they were just scientists.’”37 
In 1997, the Inspector General of the Department of Justice issued a report 
on the FBI laboratory’s explosives unit.38 This report documented numerous 
deficiencies, including inaccurate testimony, testimony beyond the competence 
of examiners, improperly prepared laboratory reports, insufficient 
documentation of test results, inadequate record management and retention, 
and failure to resolve serious and credible allegations of incompetence.39 In the 
                                                 
33  Id.; see generally Giannelli, supra note 27, 174–82 (discussing Gilchrist’s 
conduct). 
34  MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE: AN EXPOSE OF OKLAHOMA’S DEATH 
ROW MACHINE 223 (2003). Fuhrman also wrote that Gilchrist “appears to have used 
her lab tests to confirm the detectives’ hunches rather than seek independent scientific 
results. . . . She treated discovery requests with contempt and kept evidence from the 
defense. She systematically destroyed evidence at the very time when she knew that 
much of that evidence might be retested.” Id. at 232. 
35  See Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 18–19. 
36  MICHAEL J. SAKS & RICHARD VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 53 (1983). 
37  Mills et al., supra note 9 (quoting Don Plautz, a former director in the Illinois 
crime lab system); see also Teichroeb, supra note 9 (explaining that crime labs are 
often biased in favor of the prosecution). 
38  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI 
LABORATORY: AN INVESTIGATION INTO LABORATORY PRACTICES AND ALLEGED 
MISCONDUCT IN EXPLOSIVES-RELATED AND OTHER CASES, Executive Summary, pt. I, 
sec. A (1997), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oig/fbilab1/fbil1toc.htm 
[hereinafter 1997 I.G. REPORT].  
39  Id.; see also JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE 2 
(1998) (concluding that FBI examiners “had given scientifically flawed, inaccurate, 
and overstated testimony under oath in court; had altered the lab reports of examiners 
to give them a pro-prosecutorial slant, and had failed to document tests and 
examinations from which they drew incriminating conclusions, thus ensuring that their 
work could never be properly checked”); Bales, supra note 7, at 53 (“[T]he [1997 I.G. 
Report] did contain deeply disturbing findings of inadequate procedures, insufficient 
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Oklahoma City bombing case, the I.G. Report found that an examiner’s 
conclusion about the identity of the explosive charge was “speculation” and 
“tilted in such a way as to incriminate the defendants.”40 
 
3.  Cognitive Bias: Contextual Bias 
 
Another type of cognitive bias is contextual bias, which occurs when 
extraneous information influences a decision, typically in cases of ambiguity.41  
When clinical trials for a new drug are conducted, “double blind” procedures 
are used—i.e., randomized clinical trials. Neither the patient nor the physician 
knows whether the patient is receiving the new drug or a placebo (the control). 
Numerous studies have demonstrated that physicians who know that patients 
are receiving a new drug tend to see positive results, even when there are 
none.42 In short, extraneous knowledge alters our expectations, which in turn 
affects our perceptions.43 
There is no shortage of examples: “[Professor] Peter DeForest has 
described investigators who responded to inconclusive results by saying to 
forensic examiners: ‘Would it help if I told you we know he’s the guy who did 
it?’”44 One laboratory examiner “said she tried not to be swayed by detectives’ 
belief that they had a strong suspect. ‘We’re all human,’ she said. ‘I tried not to 
                                                                                                                      
supervision, and improper conduct.”); see generally Giannelli, supra note 27, at 195–
96 (discussing the 1997 I.G. Report); David Johnston, F.B.I. Lab Practices Faulted in 
Oklahoma Bomb Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1997, at A1 (discussing poor scientific 
practices in the investigation of the Oklahoma City bombing). 
40  1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 38, at pt. III, sec. F. 
41  REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 15 (“It also appears that extraneous information 
supporting a hypothesis will affect our judgement of that hypothesis, and of the 
evidence for it, even when we know we should not take the extraneous information 
into account.”). 
42  See ROBERT J. LEVINE, ETHICS AND REGULATION OF CLINICAL RESEARCH 185 
(2d ed. 1986) (“When it is feasible, a double-blind technique is employed. That is, 
neither the investigator nor the subject knows until the conclusion of the study who is 
in the treatment or control group. The purpose of double-blinding is to overcome 
biases on the part of both subjects and investigators . . . .”). 
43  Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 45 (“The simplest, most powerful, and most 
useful procedure to protect against the distorting effects of unstated assumptions, 
collateral information, and improper expectations and motivations is blind testing. An 
examiner who has no domain-irrelevant information cannot be influenced by it. An 
examiner who does not know what conclusion is hoped for or expected of her cannot 
be affected by those considerations.”). 
44  See id. at 39. The psychological literature on lineups provides another 
illustration. Eyewitnesses with reservations about their identifications often become 
positive after learning that the person they identified was the prime suspect in the case. 
See REPORT OF THE ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION’S AD HOC INNOCENCE COMM. 
TO ENSURE THE INTEGRITY OF THE CRIMINAL PROCESS, ACHIEVING JUSTICE: FREEING 
THE INNOCENT, CONVICTING THE GUILTY 37 (Paul C. Giannelli & Myrna Raeder eds., 
2006) (“Ideally, the witness should never be told whether he selected the ‘right man’ so 
that his confidence is not artificially inflated by the time of trial.”). 
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let it influence me. But I can’t say it never does.’”45 Joyce Gilchrist often 
received detectives’ views on suspects before she conducted her 
examinations.46 In another case, an FBI examiner identified a substance as 
being consistent with an explosive “based in part on the fact that pieces of cut 
detonation cord had been found in a garbage can outside the suspect’s 
house.”47 
 
4.  Cognitive Bias: Confirmation Bias 
 
Another type of cognitive bias known as “confirmation bias” concerns 
“the tendency to test a hypothesis by looking for instances that confirm it rather 
than by searching for potentially falsifying instances.”48 Confirmation bias 
played a role in the FBI’s misidentification of Brandon Mayfield’s fingerprints 
in the Madrid terrorist train bombing investigation.49 According to an FBI 
review, the “power” of the automated fingerprint correlation “was thought to 
have influenced the examiner’s initial judgment and subsequent 
examination.”50 Three other experts, one of whom was court-appointed, also 
confirmed the initial misidentification.51 These reviews were not conducted 
blind—i.e., the reviewer knew that a positive identification had already been 
made—and thus were subject to the influence of contextual/confirmation 
bias.52 
 
 
 
                                                 
45  Ruth Teichroeb, Rare Look Inside State Crime Labs Reveals Recurring  
Problems: 23 Cases in 3 Years Had DNA Test Errors, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
July 22, 2004, at A1 (quoting lab expert Denise Olson). 
46  See FUHRMAN, supra note 34, at 91 (“When Cook and other homicide 
detectives gave Gilchrist hair samples from a suspect, they would often let her know 
that this was the person they wanted to arrest.”). 
47  Bales, supra note 7, at 55 (“Of course, where the cord was found was irrelevant 
to the scientific examination of the residue on the knife and to the examiner’s 
conclusions. . . . Based on recommendations by the OIG, the FBI has instructed its 
examiners not to base forensic conclusions on unstated assumptions or information that 
is collateral to the examinations performed.”); see also id. at 52 (The 1997 I.G. Report 
“concluded that an examiner from the lab’s explosives unit had erred by purporting to 
identify the particular explosives used in the [1993] World Trade Center and Oklahoma 
City bombings. The error stemmed from the examiner’s reliance on information that 
was tied to suspects but not relevant to his scientific analysis.”). 
48  Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 7; see also REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 15 
(“We tend to look for confirming, rather than disconfirming, evidence; we may judge 
evidence of better quality if it agrees with our theory, or worse quality if it does not; 
and our beliefs can persevere even after being discredited.”). 
49  See Sara Kershaw, Spain and U.S. at Odds on Mistaken Terror Arrest, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 2004, at A1 (Spanish authorities cleared Brandon Mayfield and 
matched the fingerprints to an Algerian national). 
50  Robert B. Stacey, A Report on the Erroneous Fingerprint Individualization in 
the Madrid Train Bombing Case, 54 J. FORENSIC IDENTIFICATION 706, 713 (2004). 
51  Id. at 709–11. 
52  Id. at 713.  
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5.  Cognitive Bias: Reconstructive Effects 
 
Another type of cognitive bias involves “reconstructive effects.”53 When 
people rely on their memory, they tend to fill in gaps with what they believe 
should have occurred. One of the Inspector General’s reports on the FBI 
laboratory addressed this issue: “[C]ontemporaneous documentation is 
important to ensure that the case file accurately reflects the work performed on 
each evidence item that is tested. . . . [S]taff members may be unduly 
influenced by protocol requirements when relying on memory, and document 
what they know should have occurred when their recollection is vague.”54 
 
6.  Research 
 
Although the psychological literature on cognitive bias is well developed, 
research in forensic science has lagged.55 One researcher performed a 
rudimentary experiment involving handwriting comparisons in 198456 and then 
followed up with a study on hair examinations in 1987.57 Although Professor 
Jonakait mentioned the topic in a 1991 law review article,58 the issue was thrust 
to the forefront when Professor Risinger and his colleagues published an 
extensive article on the subject in 2002.59 
As a result of the Mayfield case, British researchers devised a covert 
experiment to test contextual bias.60 Five fingerprint examiners who were 
unfamiliar with the Mayfield prints were asked by colleagues to compare a 
crime scene print and suspect print.61 “They were told that the pair of prints 
                                                 
53  Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 15–16 (providing the example of a “forensic 
scientist who takes poor notes during an examination and prepares a skimpy report, but 
then goes back to ‘spruce them up’ shortly before trial”). 
54  OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI DNA 
LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE VULNERABILITIES 107 (May 
2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0405/final.pdf. 
55  See Elizabeth F. Loftus & Simon A. Cole, Letter to the Editor, Contaminated 
Evidence, 304 SCI. 959, 959 (May 14, 2004) (“[F]orensic scientists remain stubbornly 
unwilling to confront and control the problem of bias, insisting that it can be overcome 
through sheer force of will and good intentions.”). 
56  Larry S. Miller, Bias Among Forensic Document Examiners: A Need for 
Procedural Change, 12 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 407, 410 (1984) (“The conclusions 
and opinions reported by the examiners supported the bias hypothesis.”). 
57  Larry S. Miller, Procedural Bias in Forensic Science Examinations of Human 
Hair, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 157, 161 (1987). In the conventional method of hair 
examination, the examiner is given hair samples from a known suspect along with a 
report including information relating to the guilt of the suspect. In the study on hair 
examinations, the findings “raise some concern regarding the amount of unintentional 
bias among human hair identification examiners . . . . A preconceived conclusion that a 
questioned hair sample and a known hair sample originated from the same individual 
may influence the examiner’s opinion when the samples are similar.” Id. at 161. 
58  Jonakait, supra note 4, at 160–64. 
59  Risinger et al., supra note 25. 
60  Itiel E. Dror et al., Contextual Information Renders Experts Vulnerable to 
Making Erroneous Identifications, 156 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L 74, 75–76 (2006). 
61  Id. at 75. 
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was the one that was erroneously matched by the FBI as the Madrid bomber, 
thus creating an extraneous context that the prints were a non-match.”62 The 
participants were then instructed to ignore this information.63 The prints, in 
fact, were not from the Mayfield case; they were from cases that each of the 
participants had previously matched.64 Of the five examiners, only one still 
judged the print to be a match.65 The other four changed their opinions; three 
directly contradicted their prior identifications, and the fourth concluded that 
there was insufficient data to reach a definite conclusion.66 “This is striking 
given that all five experts had seen the identical fingerprints previously and all 
had decided that the prints were a sound and definite match.”67 
A follow-up covert study, which also involved experts, showed that 
fingerprint examiners could be biased toward a finding of identification if 
informed that the suspect confessed or toward a finding of exclusion if told that 
the suspect had an alibi.68 Another investigation focused on the effects of 
emotions on decision making.69 
Because the research in the forensic field is in its nascent stage,70 the NAS 
Report recommends further investigation of observer bias and other sources of 
                                                 
62  Id. at 76. 
63  Id.  
64  Id. at 75.  
65  Id. at 76.  
66  Id. 
67  Id.  The authors of the study concluded the “study shows that it is possible to 
alter identification decisions on the same fingerprint, solely by presenting it in a 
different context. This does not imply that fingerprint and other forensic identifications 
are not a science, but it does highlight problems of subjectivity, interpretation, and 
other psychological and cognitive elements that interact and may distort any scientific 
inquiries.” Id. at 77. 
68  Itiel E. Dror & David Charlton, Why Experts Make Errors, 56 J. FORENSIC 
IDENTIFICATION 600, 608, 612 (2006); see also Itiel Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-
analytically Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. 
FORENSIC SCI. 900 passim (2008) (discussing a meta-analysis of both studies). 
Another study concluded that external information had an effect but that its 
effects were more pronounced with novices than experts; the latter provided fewer 
definitive and erroneous judgments. As the researchers acknowledged, however, the 
examiners knew they were being tested.  Glenn Langenburg et al., Testing for Potential 
Contextual Bias Effects During the Verification Stage of the ACE-V Methodology 
When Conducting Fingerprint Comparisons, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 571, 580–81 (2009). 
69  Itiel Dror et al., When Emotions Get the Better of Us: The Effect of Contextual 
Top-Down Processing on Matching Fingerprints, 19 APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 799, 
806–07 (2005) (“The results of this study demonstrated that emotion and subliminal 
messages did influence decision making[,]” but not in clear-cut cases). 
70  For discussion of the research, see Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision 
in ‘Blind’ Justice: Expert Perception, Judgment and Visual Cognition in Forensic 
Pattern Recognition, 17 PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161 (2010); see also Bruce 
Budowle et al., A Perspective on Errors, Bias, and Interpretation in the Forensic 
Sciences and Direction for Continuing Advancement, 54 J. FORENSIC SCI. 798, 803 
(2009) (arguing that “[c]omplete ignorance to case specific information exhibits poor 
judgment and should not be considered”); D.E. Krane et al., Letter to the Editor, 
Sequential Unmasking: A Means of Minimizing Observer Effects in Forensic DNA 
Interpretation, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1006, 1006 (2008) (“The interpretation of an 
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human error in forensic examinations.71 Cognitive bias is most likely a far 
greater danger than motivational bias precisely because it is a subconscious 
influence.72 Forensic techniques that have a substantial subjective component 
should be a special concern—e.g., fingerprint identifications,73 firearms 
(ballistics) identifications,74 and handwriting comparisons.75  
 
C.  The Prosecutor 
 
Of course, the police are not the only ones who may influence government 
experts.76 Prosecutors also have pressured experts to slant their testimony.77 
                                                                                                                      
evidentiary DNA profile should not be influenced by information about a suspect’s 
DNA profile”).  
71  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (Recommendation 5) (“Such programs might 
include studies to determine the effects of contextual bias in forensic practice (e.g., 
studies to determine whether and to what extent the results of forensic analyses are 
influenced by knowledge regarding the background of the suspect and the 
investigator’s theory of the case).”). 
72  See REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 14 (“Cognitive biases are potentially more 
problematic, for these result from unconscious reasoning strategies that can lead us to 
unwarranted conclusions.”); Dror & Cole, supra note 70, at 162 (“Errors committed by 
well-intentioned experts are more problematic and dangerous . . . .”); Risinger et al., 
supra note 25, at 11 (finding cognitive bias “far more pervasive but generally 
unnoticed” and “a problem in some respects more troublesome and troubling than the 
intentional misconduct”). 
73  See Commonwealth v. Patterson, 840 N.E.2d 12, 16–17 (Mass. 2005) (“In the 
evaluation stage, . . . the examiner relies on his subjective judgment to determine 
whether the quality and quantity of those similarities are sufficient to make an 
identification, an exclusion, or neither.”); Sandy L. Zabell, Fingerprint Evidence, 13 J. 
L. & POL’Y 143, 158 (2005) (“In contrast to the scientifically-based statistical 
calculations performed by a forensic scientist in analyzing DNA profile frequencies, 
each fingerprint examiner renders an opinion as to the similarity of friction ridge detail 
based on his subjective judgment.”). 
74  See United States v. Glynn, 578 F. Supp. 2d 567, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]he 
Government did not seriously contest the Court’s conclusions that ballistics lacked the 
rigor of science and that, whatever else it might be, its methodology was too subjective 
to permit opinions to be stated to ‘a reasonable degree of ballistic certainty.’”); United 
States v. Monteiro, 407 F. Supp. 2d 351, 372 (D. Mass. 2006) (“Because an examiner’s 
bottom line opinion as to an identification is largely a subjective one, there is no 
reliable statistical or scientific methodology which will currently permit the expert to 
testify that it is a ‘match’ to an absolute certainty, or to an arbitrary degree of statistical 
certainty.”). 
75  See United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) 
(“Such [overly fine] distinctions are certainly improper in forensic document 
examination, where it is conceded that conclusions are drawn, in large part, on 
subjective criteria.”). 
76  ABA Criminal Justice Standards state that “[a] prosecutor who engages an 
expert for an opinion should respect the independence of the expert and should not 
seek to dictate the formation of the expert’s opinion on the subject. . . . [T]he 
prosecutor should explain to the expert his or her role in the trial as an impartial expert 
. . . .” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND 
DEFENSE FUNCTION 58 (Standard 3-3.3(a)) (3d ed. 1993), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/crimjust/standards/prosecutionfunction.pdf. A comparable 
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For more than a decade, a Texas pathologist worked closely with prosecutors 
and police “‘shad[ing] things to follow along with the police theory of the 
case.’”78 As the special prosecutor remarked: “If the prosecution theory was 
that death was caused by a Martian death ray, then that was what [the 
pathologist] reported.”79 
In one of Joyce Gilchrist’s cases, an appellate court wrote: “[W]e are 
greatly disturbed by the implications that the Oklahoma County District 
Attorney’s Office may have placed undue pressure upon Ms. Gilchrist to give a 
so-called expert opinion, which was beyond scientific capabilities . . . .”80 In 
Troedel v. Wainwright,81 a capital murder case, the court found that a FBI 
expert shaped his testimony in a way that was “at the very least, . . .  
                                                                                                                      
standard applies to defense counsel. See id. at 188 (Standard 4-4.4(a)). The 
commentary to this standard elaborates: “Statements made by physicians, psychiatrists, 
and other experts about their experiences as witnesses in criminal cases indicate the 
need for circumspection on the part of lawyers who engage experts. Nothing should be 
done by a lawyer to cast suspicion on the process of justice by suggesting that the 
expert color an opinion to favor the interests of the client the lawyer represents.” Id. at 
189. 
77  See generally Paul C. Giannelli & Kevin C. McMunigal, Prosecutors, Ethics, 
and Expert Witnesses, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1493, 1520–27 (2007) (discussing the 
problems associated with prosecutors and experts). Experts often are pressured by 
attorneys to “push the envelope”—not a surprising occurrence in an adversary system. 
See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 31 (“‘Most attorneys . . . like to let you know 
what their opinions of the facts of the case are — irrespective of the scientific 
conclusions.’”) (quoting Dr. Robert Shaler, former head of N.Y.C. Medical Examiner’s 
DNA unit). 
78  Roberto Suro, Ripples of a Pathologist’s Misconduct in Graves and Courts of 
West Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1992, at A22 (quoting Tommy J. Turner, appointed 
by a state district judge to investigate Dr. Ralph R. Erdmann).  “[A]ll the while [Dr. 
Erdmann] worked in close collaboration with many prosecutors and police officials, 
some of whom are now prominent in politics.” Id.; see also Roy Bragg, Autopsy 
Record of Pathologist Who Quit Raises Many Eyebrows, HOUS. CHRON., Mar. 8, 1992, 
at A1 (Dr. Linda Norton, a former Dallas County assistant medical examiner, stated: 
“‘It’s as though there’s some sort of collusion between Dr. Erdmann and the DA.’”). 
79  Richard L. Fricker, Pathologist’s Plea Adds to Turmoil: Discovery of Possibly 
Hundreds of Faked Autopsies Helps Defense Challenges, 79 A.B.A. J. 24, 24 (Mar. 
1993) (quoting Tommy J. Turner); see also Chip Brown, Pathologist Accused of 
Falsifying Autopsies, Botching Trial Evidence Forensics, L.A. TIMES, April 12, 1992, 
at A24 (“[F]ormer Dallas County assistant medical examiner Linda Norton was quoted 
as saying Erdmann routinely performs ‘made-to-order autopsies that support a police 
version of a story.’”). 
80  McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988).  There, the 
court ultimately held that despite these concerns, it “could not conclude . . . that 
appellant has established the prosecution’s knowing use of false or misleading 
evidence.” Id.; see also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 258 
(1988) (“The District Court further concluded that one of the prosecutors improperly 
argued with an expert witness during a recess of the grand jury after the witness gave 
testimony adverse to the Government.”). 
81  667 F. Supp. 1456 (S.D. Fla. 1986), aff’d, 828 F.2d 670 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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misleading.”82 The expert claimed that the prosecutor had “pushed” him to 
enhance his testimony, a claim the prosecutor substantiated.83 
Consequently, removing the crime laboratory from police control still 
leaves a problem of prosecutorial influence, albeit perhaps lessened. 
 
II.  COUNTERARGUMENTS 
 
There are several criticisms of the proposal for establishing independent 
laboratories, which are discussed in this Part. 
 
A.  Integration with Police Investigative Function 
 
A forensic laboratory may play an important role in the early stages of a 
criminal investigation. As two commentators have noted: “Increasing the 
laboratory’s geographical or organizational remoteness . . . can limit the 
effectiveness of the laboratory’s participation in the investigative phases of a 
case, when its scientific input may have the greatest chance of contributing to 
justice.”84 This argument raises a serious concern. However, homicide 
                                                 
82  Id. at 1459. The expert’s report of a gunshot residue test concluded that swabs 
“from the hands of Troedel and Hawkins contained antimony and barium in amounts 
typically found on the hands of a person who has discharged a firearm or has had his 
hands in close proximity to a discharging firearm.” Id. at 1458. The expert testified in 
accordance with this report at Hawkins’s trial but enhanced his testimony at Troedel’s 
trial, where he testified that “Troedel had fired the murder weapon.” Id. In contrast, 
during federal habeas proceedings, the same expert testified in a deposition that “he 
could not, from the results of his tests, determine or say to a scientific certainty who 
had fired the murder weapon” and “the differences in the amount of barium and 
antimony on the hands of Troedel and Hawkins were basically insignificant.” Id. at 
1459. In granting habeas relief, the court “conclude[d] that the opinion Troedel had 
fired the weapon was known by the prosecution not to be based on the results of the 
neutron activation analysis tests, or on any scientific certainty or even probability. 
Thus, the subject testimony was not only misleading, but also was used by the State 
knowing it to be misleading.” Id. at 1459–60. 
83  Id. at 1459 (“[A]s Mr. Riley candidly admitted in his deposition, he was 
‘pushed’ further in his analysis at Troedel’s trial than at Hawkins’ trial. . . . [A]t the . . . 
evidentiary hearing held before this Court, one of the prosecutors testified that, at 
Troedel’s trial, after Mr. Riley had rendered his opinion which was contained in his 
written report, the prosecutor pushed to ‘see if more could have been gotten out of this 
witness.’”). 
84  Jan S. Bashinski & Joseph L. Peterson, Forensic Sciences, in LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: POLICE MANAGEMENT 559, 581 (William Geller & Darrel Stephens 
eds., 4th ed. 2004). Bashinski and Peterson state: “Remoteness also makes the police 
department less able to direct the efforts of the laboratory toward the cases that the 
department considers most important . . . .” Id.; see also Bales, supra note 7, at 55 
(“[T]he relationship between labs and law enforcement has flourished because of 
practical benefits—for example, streamlining tasks such as close and timely 
communication, the transfer of evidence, and record-keeping.”); NDAA Statement, 
supra note 18 (“We believe that laboratories housed within government agencies and 
whose mission is focused on public safety are likely to be more responsive and 
accountable to those community needs than those situated otherwise.”). 
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detectives work closely with medical examiner officials in death investigations, 
and medical examiner offices are typically independent of the police.  
 
B.  Practicability 
 
According to a 2005 census, there are now 389 publicly funded crime 
laboratories in the United States: 210 state or regional laboratories, eighty-four 
county laboratories, sixty-two municipal laboratories, and thirty-three federal 
laboratories.85 Some of these laboratories are quite small: “The median staff 
size in 2005 was 16.”86 This suggests that some laboratories could probably not 
exist as an independent entity. 
 
C.  Funding 
 
Because underfunding of crime laboratories in this country is chronic, 
resources are always an issue.87 The minority report of the Illinois Capital 
Punishment Commission argued that funding for the state laboratory would be 
jeopardized if it were separated from the police:  
 
This new agency will have to compete with other, larger agencies for 
scarce state resources. Retaining the forensic laboratory system as 
part of the Illinois State Police provides an opportunity for achieving 
economies of scale and administration, as well as security in funding 
and accountability that might not otherwise be available for a much 
smaller, stand-alone agency left to fend for itself.88 
 
In contrast, the NAS Report assumed that laboratory independence would 
protect a laboratory’s budget. According to the report, law enforcement control 
“leads to significant concerns related to the independence of the laboratory and 
its budget.”89 Under this view, independence would mean “the forensic science 
laboratories would be able to set their own budget priorities and not have to 
compete with the parent law enforcement agencies.”90 
                                                 
85  See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF 
PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME LABORATORIES 8 (2005), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpffcl05.pdf. 
86  Id. at 2.  
87  See PRESIDENT’S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 
OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 255 (1967) (“[T]he great 
majority of police department laboratories have only minimal equipment and lack 
highly skilled personnel able to use the modern equipment now being developed           
. . . .”); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND 
GOALS, REPORT ON POLICE 304 (1974) (“Too many police crime laboratories have 
been set up on budgets that preclude the recruitment of qualified, professional 
personnel.”). 
88  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 54. 
89  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 183–84. 
90  Id. at 184; see also SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 257 (“Crime laboratory 
budgets should be independent from the police . . . .”). 
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Because of the diversity of crime laboratories and their funding structures, 
it is almost impossible to predict how funding would be affected if laboratories 
became independent. 
 
D.  Efficacy of Reform 
 
The minority report of the Illinois Capital Punishment Commission also 
argued that an independent laboratory would not solve the problem of police 
influence. Because police and prosecutors use crime laboratories far more than 
defense attorneys do, the minority believed that close relationships were 
inevitable.91 There is some merit in this position. Yet there is a difference 
between working with someone, even extensively, and working with someone 
who is a superior (or works for a superior) within the same organization. 
 
III.  THE NAS PROPOSAL 
 
The NAS Report recommends only that “administrative control” of the 
laboratory be removed from law enforcement agencies or prosecutors.92 The 
report went on to explain: 
 
Ideally, public forensic science laboratories should be independent of 
or autonomous within law enforcement agencies. In these contexts, 
the director would have an equal voice with others in the justice 
system on matters involving the laboratory and other agencies. The 
laboratory also would be able to set its own priorities with respect to 
cases, expenditures, and other important issues.93 
 
In other words, the goal is for a laboratory to have sufficient autonomy to 
protect the integrity of the laboratory’s findings. As a byproduct of a laboratory 
controversy,94 the Virginia legislature in 2005 made the Division of Forensic 
Science a separate department under the Secretary of Public Safety.95 The 
                                                 
91  CAPITAL PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 53 (“The reality is that no 
matter how ‘independent’ this separate state agency is, the bulk of its work will still be 
for police agencies and prosecutors. As is true today for the vast majority of cases, the 
forensic experts will be called to testify by the prosecution and these experts will 
undoubtedly continue to be subject to cross-examination for that testimonial history. 
As a result, an ‘independent’ laboratory will be subject to criticism as a 
‘police/prosecutor’ lab even if it is not under the direct control and management of a 
police agency, because of the nature of its day to day work.”). 
92  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 24 (“Congress should authorize and appropriate 
incentive funds . . . for the purpose of removing all public forensic laboratories and 
facilities from the administrative control of law enforcement agencies or prosecutors’ 
offices.”). 
93  Id. at 184. 
94  See Giannelli, supra note 27, at 192–95 (discussing the Earl Washington Jr. 
case where a mentally retarded man had been convicted of a rape-murder and spent 
seventeen years in prison, only to be pardoned based on DNA evidence that was 
erroneously interpreted by experts). 
95  VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1100 (2005) (changing Division of Forensic Science into 
the Department of Forensic Science). A Forensic Science Board and Scientific 
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laboratory had previously been under the Department of Criminal Justice 
Services. Although perhaps not a major change, this reorganization did 
increase laboratory autonomy. 
The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors proposed a different 
approach.  That organization recommended that crime laboratories should not 
be removed “from parent agencies if the parent agency is required to document 
how crime laboratories have scientific autonomy with the freedom to conduct 
testing and report results without pressure from [external] activity, interest, or 
influence.”96 
In sum, the critical issue is for law enforcement and crime laboratories to 
acknowledge the problem and then to take steps to insulate the laboratory from 
improper influence. 
 
IV.  ADDITIONAL MEASURES 
 
The problems raised by the law enforcement-crime laboratory relationship 
should also be addressed by the implementation of additional measures,97 many 
of which appear as other recommendations in the NAS Report. As one 
commentator noted: “To the extent that we are aware of our vulnerability to 
bias, we may be able to control it. In fact, a feature of good scientific practice 
is the institution of processes—such as blind testing, the use of precise 
measurements, standardized procedures, statistical analysis—that control for 
bias.”98 
First, case files need to document the laboratory analysis. The lack of 
bench notes was a significant problem in the laboratory scandals. For example, 
the Chicago,99 Houston,100 and FBI explosives unit101 investigations all found 
inadequate documentation in forensic case files.102 
                                                                                                                      
Advisory Committee were created at the same time. VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-1109 & 
1111 (2005). 
96  An Open Letter from the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors to 
Senator Patrick Leahy Regarding the NAS Report, (March 17, 2009), in FORENSIC 
MAG. (April/May 2009), available at http://www.forensicmag.com/ articles.asp?pid 
=269. 
97  See Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: Hearings Before the 
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, 111th Cong., Sept. 9, 2009 (statement of 
Matthew Redle, County and Prosecuting Attorney, Sheridan County, Wyoming) 
(discussing the importance of implementing quality control measures in laboratories 
such as “laboratory accreditation and personnel certification programs . . . ; internal 
peer review procedures; maintenance of appropriate testing documentation to facilitate 
internal and external peer review of individual case testing; external and internal 
performance audits; regular proficiency testing as a check on both personnel and 
protocol performance; and corrective action procedures when proficiency testing or 
casework errors are discovered”). 
98  REDMAYNE, supra note 24, at 16 (footnote omitted). 
99  Letter from Professor George F. Sensabaugh, University of California at 
Berkeley, to Locke E. Bowman, The MacArthur Justice Center, University of Chicago 
Law School 5 (Oct. 16, 2003)  (on file with author) (“Overall, the documentation of the 
lab work as described in the three pages of lab notes is inadequate and incomplete. 
Moreover, the formal lab reports describe results of testing for which there is no record 
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Second, bench notes should be recorded contemporaneously with the 
examination. Otherwise, the examiner is subject to “reconstructive effects.”103 
Third, protocols should address contextual bias by shielding examiners 
from information that is not germane to the examination.104 
Fourth, comprehensive laboratory reports are necessary.105 Currently, 
laboratory reports often are “terse to the point of being indecipherable.”106 For 
example, some laboratory reports provide only a brief statement of the results: 
                                                                                                                      
in the lab notes. In short, the documentation in this case falls short of accepted 
scientific standards.”). 
100  See MICHAEL R. BROMWICH, THIRD REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT 
INVESTIGATOR FOR THE HOUSTON POLICE DEPARTMENT CRIME LABORATORY AND 
PROPERTY ROOM 28 (June 30, 2005) (“Among other problems it identified, the 2002 
DPS audit found that no such written procedures [for case notes and lab reports] 
existed and identified numerous deficiencies in the documentation contained in the lab 
reports.”), available at http://www.hpdlabinvestigation.org/reports/050630report.pdf. 
101  See 1997 I.G. REPORT, supra note 38 (recommending the preparation of 
adequate case files to support reports); Bales, supra note 7, at 57 (noting that one FBI 
examiner “testified that he had performed certain tests that were not described in his 
notes”). 
102  See Law v. State, 307 S.E.2d 904, 908 (Ga. 1983) (Smith, J., dissenting) (“It 
is an insult to intelligent people to say that a scientific test was conducted from which 
absolutely no notes or records survive. . . .  A basic principle of scientific testing is that 
careful records of test procedure and results are to be scrupulously maintained. A 
scientific test without an accompanying report of the testing environment, number of 
trials, raw results and analyzed data is in reality no test at all.”). 
103  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
104  ABA DNA Standard 16-3.1(a)(v) recommends laboratories “follow 
procedures designed to minimize bias when interpreting test results.” ABA DNA 
STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 6.  Additionally, “[c]ognitive bias (e.g., observer effects) 
occurs because people tend to see what they expect to see, and this typically affects 
their decisions in cases of ambiguity.” Id. at 67. See also NAS  REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 26 (Recommendation 8: “Forensic laboratories should establish routine quality 
assurance and quality control procedures to ensure the accuracy of forensic analyses 
and the work of forensic practitioners. Quality control procedures should be designed 
to identify mistakes, fraud, and bias; confirm the continued validity and reliability of 
standard operating procedures and protocols; ensure that best practices are being 
followed; and correct procedures and protocols that are found to need improvement.”). 
105  ABA DNA Standard 16-3.3 recommends the use of comprehensive laboratory 
reports. ABA DNA STANDARDS, supra note 11, at 7. The Journal of Forensic Sciences, 
the official publication of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences, published a 
symposium on the ethical responsibilities of forensic scientists in 1989. Symposium, 
Ethical Conflicts in the Forensic Science, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 717 (1989). One article 
discussed a number of laboratory reporting practices, including (1) “preparation of 
reports containing minimal information in order not to give the ‘other side’ 
ammunition for cross-examination,” (2) “reporting of findings without an 
interpretation on the assumption that if an interpretation is required it can be provided 
from the witness box,” and (3) “[o]mitting some significant point from a report to trap 
an unsuspecting cross-examiner.” Douglas M. Lucas, The Ethical Responsibilities of 
the Forensic Scientist: Exploring the Limits, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 719, 724 (1989). 
Lucas was the Director of the Centre of Forensic Sciences, Ministry of the Solicitor 
General, Toronto, Ontario.  Id. at 719. 
106  Bales, supra note 7, at 56. 
264 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
“e.g., ‘The green, brown plant material in item # 1 was identified as 
marijuana.’”107 In its recent decision, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,108 the 
Supreme Court noted that the report in that case contained  
 
only the bare-bones statement that ‘[t]he substance was found to 
contain: Cocaine.’ At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what 
tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and 
whether interpreting their results required the exercise of judgment or 
the use of skills that the analysts may not have possessed.109  
 
Fred Zain,110 Joyce Gilchrist,111 and Pam Fish,112 among others, omitted critical 
information from their reports. 
Fifth, the reporting of test results should be accompanied by an 
explanation of the significance of any finding.113 A recent investigation of 
forensic testimony in DNA exoneration cases revealed that some experts gave 
misleading testimony by omitting critical information.114 
                                                 
107  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 186. 
108  129 S. Ct. 2527 (2009).  The Court held that admission of a laboratory 
certificate identifying a substance as cocaine, in the absence of an opportunity to cross-
examine the analyst, violated the Confrontation Clause.  Id. at 2532. 
109  Id. at 2537 (citations omitted). 
110  In re Investigation of the W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., Serology Div., 438 
S.E.2d 501, 503 (W. Va. 1993) (stating Zain “fail[ed] to report conflicting results” and 
“fail[ed] to conduct or to report conducting additional testing to resolve conflicting 
results”). 
111  Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1064 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Ms. Gilchrist thus 
provided the jury with evidence implicating Mr. Mitchell in the sexual assault of the 
victim which she knew was rendered false and misleading by evidence withheld from 
the defense.”); McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1218 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988) 
(“[T]he forensic report was at best incomplete, and at worst inaccurate and misleading. 
. . . Gilchrist admitted at trial, however, that she failed to include her conclusion . . . in 
the forensic report given to Mr. Wilson. This significant omission, whether intentional 
or inadvertent, resulted in a trial by ambush . . . .”) (citations omitted). 
112  See SCHECK ET AL., supra note 14, at 125 (“Fish’s misleading testimony in the 
Willis case, which led to the conviction of an innocent man and allowed a predator to 
continue roaming the streets, shows why the state should have turned over all of Fish’s 
laboratory notes and data, rather than merely presenting her final report.”). 
113  See FORENSIC ANALYSIS: WEIGHING BULLET LEAD EVIDENCE 110–11 (2004) 
(“The conclusions in laboratory reports should be expanded to include the limitations 
of compositional analysis of bullet lead evidence. . . . Moreover, a section of the 
laboratory report translating the technical conclusions into language that a jury could 
understand would greatly facilitate the proper use of this evidence in the criminal 
justice system.”). 
114  See Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1 (2009). The study identified 
several different types of invalid testimony: (1) presenting non-probative evidence as 
probative, (2) discounting exculpatory evidence, (3) using inaccurate frequencies or 
statistics, (4) providing a statistic without support, (5) providing non-numerical 
statements without empirical support, and (6) attributing the source of evidence to the 
defendant. Id. at 16–20. 
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Sixth, examiners should be prohibited from testifying beyond the 
laboratory report (unless a supplemental report is issued), a requirement that 
would protect against overreaching by prosecutors115 and preclude the 
opportunity for improper embellishments. 
Finally, an enforceable code of ethics should be adopted.116 
Enforcement of these procedures can be effectuated through accreditation. 
For example, the American Society of Crime Lab Directors/Laboratory 
Accreditation Board requires quality assurance programs—i.e., proficiency 
testing, technical reviews, audits, and corrective action procedures.117 The NAS 
Report recommends mandatory accreditation of laboratories and the 
certification of examiners.118 
Legal procedures such as full pretrial discovery119 and the availability of 
defense experts also are important protections.120 Not only do they serve due 
process norms, they also are quality control mechanisms. Laboratory personnel 
should understand that the required documentation generated by the 
examination will be turned over to the defense and may be reviewed by 
defense experts. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Law enforcement influence over laboratory decisions is a serious problem. 
In an ideal world, independent crime laboratories would be the solution. Crime 
laboratories, however, have historically developed within police agencies, and 
                                                 
115  See supra notes 76–83 and accompanying text. 
116  See NAS  REPORT, supra note 1, at 26 (Recommendation 9 urges the 
establishment of “a national code of ethics for all forensic science disciplines and 
encourage[s] individual societies to incorporate this national code as part of their 
professional code of ethics.”). 
117  See ASCLD/LAB BYLAWS 1 (2008), available at http://www.ascld-
lab.org/about_us/bylaws.html. 
118  NAS REPORT, supra note 1, at 25 (Recommendation 7: “Laboratory 
accreditation and individual certification of forensic science professionals should be 
mandatory, and all forensic science professionals should have access to a certification 
process.”). 
119  See generally PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC 
EVIDENCE 145–211 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing  shortcomings of criminal discovery). 
120  The minority report of the Illinois Capital Punishment Commission believed 
that instead of an independent lab, a better solution “would be provided by state 
funding for the creation of a permanent cadre of forensic experts available to defense 
attorneys for consultation and review of forensic and scientific evidence.” CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT COMM., supra note 15, at 54. “Such a group of permanently retained 
experts would provide a ready and consistent resource for information and assistance to 
defense attorneys (both privately retained and publicly appointed) about complicated 
areas of science that are not usually taught in law schools or easily understood.” Id.; 
see generally Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a 
Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1305 (2004) (discussing the need 
to bolster the right to defense experts). 
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decades of entrenchment make it difficult to remove laboratories completely 
from law enforcement control.121 
This does not mean, of course, that the status quo should be preserved. If 
located within law enforcement agencies, forensic laboratories should be as 
autonomous as possible and should be run in accordance with scientific norms, 
including procedures to protect against all types of bias. The NAS Report was 
not the last messenger. Within months of the report’s release, the Supreme 
Court wrote that “[f]orensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of 
manipulation.”122 
 
                                                 
121  See Risinger et al., supra note 25, at 43 (“The establishment of freestanding 
government forensic laboratories, though occasionally advocated, would require such a 
revolution in thinking and organization, and diminish so many established bureaucratic 
empires, that it would take a generation of patient lobbying to have a chance of 
success.”) (citation omitted). 
122  Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2536 (2009) (citing the 
NAS Report). 
